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TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY IN NORTH
CAROLINA*
ROBERT E. LEEf
NATURE OF TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY
Where real property is conveyed by deed or by will to two persons
who are at the time husband and wife, a "tenancy by the entirety" is
created. Sometimes it is referred to as an "estate by the entirety."
The husband and wife take the whole estate as one person. Each has
the whole; neither has a separate estate or interest; but the survivor,
whether husband or wife, is entitled to the entire estate, and the
right of the survivor cannot be defeated by the other's conveyance
of the property by deed or will to a stranger. The title to the land
cannot be conveyed during the existence of the marriage without
the signature of both the husband and the wife. Neither tenant can
defeat or in any way affect the right of survivorship of the other.
Each spouse is considered as the owner of the entire estate because
of the common law fiction of the unity of husband and wife-"a unity
of the person."'
Davis v. Bass,2 decided in 1924, is the magna charta on the estate
by the entirety in North Carolina. In an excellent opinion, Chief
Justice Stacy described this anomalous estate and concisely stated its
incidents. Quoting from the opinion of Chief Justice Stacy, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina in 1955, in describing this estate,
said:
* This article is adapted from a chapter of the author's forthcoming trea-
tise on North Carolina Family Law, to be published in the spring of 1963 by
Michie Co.
t Professor of Law, Wake Forest College.
'Lanier v. Dawes, 255 N.C. 458, 121 S.E.2d 857 (1961); Edwards v.
Arnold, 250 N.C. 500, 109 S.E.2d 205 (1959); Woolard v. Smith, 244 N.C.
489, 94 S.E.2d 466 (1956); Nesbitt v. Fairview Farms, Inc., 239 N.C. 481,
80 S.E.2d 472 (1954) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Hall, 201 N.C. 787, 161 S.E. 484
(1931); Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 124 S.E. 566 (1924); Freeman v. Bel-
fer, 173 N.C. 581, 92 S.E. 486 (1917); Motley v. Whitemore, 19 N.C. 537
(1837). For a general discussion of tenanciks by the entirety, see 26 Am.
Jur, Husband and Wife §§ 66-86 (1940); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§§ 6.5-6.6 (1952) ; 41 C.J.S., Husband atfd Wife §§ 33, 34 (1944) ; MADDEN,
PERSONS AND DOmESTIc RELATIONS § 45 (1931) ; 4 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
§§ 615-19 (1954) ; 2 THrOMPSPN, REAL PROPERTY §§ 1784-792 (repl. 1961);
Phipps, Tenancies by Entireties, 25 TEMPLE L.Q. 24 (1951); Annot., 141
A.L.R. 179 (1942).
'Supra, note 1.
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(1) This tenancy by the entirety takes its origin from the
common law when husband and wife were regarded as one
person, and a conveyance to them by name was a conveyance
in law to but one person. (2) These two individuals, by vir-
tue of their marital relationship, acquire the entire estate, and
each is deemed to be seized of the whole, and not of a moiety
or any undivided portion thereof. They are seized of the
whole, because at common law they were considered but one
person; and the estate thus created has never been destroyed
or changed by statute in North Carolina. (3) As between
them (husband and wife) there is but one owner, and that
is neither the one or the other, but both together, in their
peculiar relationship to each other, constituting the proprietor-
ship of the whole, and of every part and parcel thereof.
(4) The estate rests upon the doctrine of the unity of the
person, and, upon the death of one, the whole belongs to the
other, not solely by right of survivorship, but also by virtue
of the grant which vested the entire estate in each grantee.8
An estate by the entirety is a form of co-ownership of real prop-
erty held by a husband and wife with the right of survivorship. It
cannot be severed or divided into two separate interests by the act
of one of the spouses.4 Statutes of partition are not applicable to
such estates5 and there can be no partition during the marriage, for
this would imply a separated interest in each.6 It can, however, be
destroyed or terminated by the joint acts of the husband and wife.
But if they cannot mutually agree upon a sale or a division of the
property, and there is no divorce, the entire property becomes vested
in the survivor.
The tenancy by the entirety is today recognized in only nineteen
states and the District of Columbia, and among these jurisdictions
there is a variance as to the incidents.7 This article is concerned
Carter v. Continental Ins. Co., 242 N.C. 578, 579-80, 89 S.E.2d 122, 123
(1955). Other portions of Davis v. Bass were quoted at length in Lanier v.
Dawes, 255 N.C. 458, 461-62, 121 S.E.2d 857, 860 (1961).
"Jones v. W. A. Smith & Co., 149 N.C. 317, 62 S.E. 1092 (1908); see
Carter v. Continental Ins. Co., 242 N.C. 578, 580, 89 S.E.2d 122, 124 (1955).
See generally 26 Am. Jum., Husband and Wife §§ 66, 81 (1940); 41 C.J.S.,
Husband and Wife §§ 34(c), 34(d) (1) (b) (1944).
'See note 4 supra.
6 See Carter v- Continental Ins. Co., 242 N.C. 578, 580, 89 S.E.2d 122, 123
(1955).
"The jurisdictions, besides North Carolina, recognizing tenancy by the
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only with the characteristics and incidents of the tenancy by the
entirety in North Carolina.
Tenancies by the entirety are very popular in North Carolina.
It is estimated that fully ninety per cent of all husbands and wives
select this form of co-ownership when a home is purchased.' The
Supreme Court of North Carolina in 1954 said: "And the doctrine
of title by entireties between husband and wife as it existed at com-
mon law remains unchanged by statute in this State. Decisions of
this Court so holding are too numerous to list."9 Two years later
the same court said: "No sound reason. has been suggested why the
right to create these estates should be limited or discouraged."'
Forces causing the elimination of tenancies by the entirety from
so many states include (1) the growing independence of women,
and (2) the demands of creditors for increased access to the assets
of their debtors." Although the tenancy by the entirety does operate
to the detriment of the creditor class, it would seem definitely to have
advantages for the wife, who usually outlives her husband. If a
tenancy by the entirety could be reached by the creditors of either
the husband or the wife, the interest of the other spouse would be
adversely affected. There is, of course, nothing to prevent a hus-
band or a wife from acquiring real estate solely in his or her own
name. But if the couple buy, for example, a home as tenants by the
entirety they will have at least a place in which they can live the rest
of their marital life, free from unanticipated contract and tort
claims.'
Public policy should favor, at least in the ownership of a home,
the tenancy by the entirety. The family life of the state is strength-
ened when married couples are encouraged to buy and make im-
entirety are: Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Indiana,
Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New
York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia,
and Wyoming. For a table, with citations, setting forth the variable inci-
dents of an estate by the entirety in the several jurisdictions, see Phipps,
supra note 1. For a recent listing, see 4 THomPsoN, op. cit. supra note 1,
§ 1784.
,This estimate has been based upon conversations with real-estate opera-
tors.
'Nesbitt v. Fairview Farms, Inc., 239 N.C. 481, 486, 80 S.E.2d 472, 476-.
77 (1954).0 Woolard v. Smith, 244 N.C. 489, 495, 94 S.E.2d 466, 4.70 (1956).
1 4 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 621, 623; 2 A mmcAN LAW OF PROP-
ERTY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 6.6(d).1 The same result could probable also be achieved by improved home-
stead laws.
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provements to a house, which they and their children can call
"home." There is in North Carolina probably no other rule of
property which does so much to solidify the marital status.
CREATION OF TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY
A tenancy by the entirety may be created by deed or by will.
"When land is conveyed or devised to husband and wife, nothing
else appearing, they take by the entirety, and upon the death of
either the other takes the whole by the right of survivorship."' If
the grantees in a deed are actually at the time husband and wife, a
tenancy by the entirety is created even though they are not named
as such, and even though there is no express mention in the instru-
ment of a tenancy by the entirety.14 Thus in Byrd v. Patterson"5
a deed to a named person "and wife" was held a sufficient designa-
tion of the grantees and vested in them a tenancy by the entirety.
The name of the wife appeared nowhere in the deed, but the court
said that when necessary this could be proved by extrinsic evidence.10
There is one instance where the grantees in a deed, who are hus-
band and wife, do not take as tenants by the entirety." This is
where there is a partition deed or a voluntary exchange of deeds by
tenants in common in pursuance of a scheme to divide the land held
by them in common.' 8 In Smith v. Smith9 the court said:
This Court has consistently held that where tenants in com-
mon divide the common land and by exchange of deeds allot
to each his or her share of the land, the deeds employed create
no new title and serve only to sever the unity of possession.
And if any of such deeds names the tenant and his wife or the
tenant and her husband as grantees, no estate by the entireties
is thereby created, even if they are so named with the consent
" Moore v. Greenville Banking & Trust Co., 178 N.C. 118, 124, 100 S.E.
269, 272 (1919); accord, Bowling v. Bowling, 252 N.C. 527, 114 S.E.2d 228
(1960); Edwards v. Batts, 245 N.C. 693, 97 S.E.2d 101 (1957); Byrd v.
Patterson, 229 N.C. 156, 48 S.E.2d 45 (1948); see Smith v. Smith, 249 N.C.
669, 677, 107 S.E.2d 530, 535-36 (1959) ;. Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 207,
124 S.E. 566, 570 (1924).
1441 C.J.S., Husband and Wife § 31(b) (1) (1944). See Byrd v. Patter-
son, 229 N.C. 156, 158, 48 S.E.2d 45, 46-47 (1948) and, by inference, other
cases in note 13.
15229 N.C. 156, 48 S.E.2d 45 (1948).
1d. at 159, 48 S.E.2d at 47.
17 Smith v. Smith, 249 N.C. 669, 107 S.E.2d 530 (1959) (prior cases cited
therein).18 Id. at 677, 107 S.E.2d at 536.
19249 N.C. 669, 107 S.E.2d 530 (1959).
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of the tenant. The grantees, must be both jointly named and
jointly entitled . . . A partition deed assigns to heir or
co-tenant only what is already his. He acquires no title to the
land by such deed. He already has title by inheritance from
the ancestor or by the deed of conveyance to the tenants in
common. The partition deed merely fixes the boundaries to
his share that he may hold it in severalty. If the partition
deed is made to cotenant and spouse, there is created no estate
by entireties. There is no unity of time and title, and the
grantees are not jointly named and jointly entitled."
But where there is no evidence that a voluntary exchange of deeds
between tenants in common was in the nature of a partition of the
land, there may be conveyance by one tenant in common of his share
to another tenant in common, and the wife of the other tenant in
common to hold as tenants by the entirety.2'
A tenancy by the entirety is not created if the. grantees are not
legally husband and wife even though they are so described.22 The
conveyance will be construed a tenancy in common. This was the
situation in Lawrence v. Heavner,28 where a man bought real estate
with his own funds and had .the title conveyed to hirmself and a
woman under the mistaken belief that they were husband and wife.
It turned out that the woman had a living, undivorced husband at the
time of the purported marriage, and subsequently an annulment was
rendered. The court noted that nothing else appearing, the parties
hold the realty as tenants in common.
The nature of a tenancy by the entirety depends upon the marital
status of the parties as of the time of its creation. Thus where real
property is conveyed to a man and a woman who are not married,
but who afterwards intermarry, they will continue to hold as tenants
in common.24 This has been said to be so even though the con-
20 Id. at 677, 107 S.E.2d at 536.
1 Morton v. Blades Lumber Co., 154 N.C. 278, 70 S.E. 467 (1911); see
Smith v. Smith, 249 N.C. 669, 678, 107 S.E.2d 530, 536 (1959).
2 E.g., Lawrence v. Heavner, 232 N.C. 557, 61 S.E.2d 697 (1950); see
Grant v. Toatley, 244 N.C. 463, 466, 94 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1956). See gen-
erally 26 Am. Jim., Husband and Wife § 70 (1940) ; 41 C.J.S., Husband and
Wife § 31(b) (1) (1944).232 N.C. 557, 61 S.E.2d 697 (1950).
2" 26 Am. Jui., Husband and Wife §§ 70, 87 (1940); MADDEN, PERSONS
AND DOMESTIc RELATIONS §45 (1931); see Davis v. Bass, 178 N.C. 200,
207, 124 S.E. 566, 570 (1924); Isley v. Sellars, 153 N.C. 374, 377, 69 S.E.
279, 280 (1910); Jones v. W. A. Smith & Co., 149 N.C. 317, 319, 62 S.E.
1092, 1093 (1908).
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veyance was made to them in anticipation of their intermarrying."
If real property is given to A, B, and C, and A and B are husband
and wife, they, being in law considered one person, will take a half
interest in the property and C will take the other half. Thus A and
B hold one-half of the land as tenants by the entirety and C holds the
other half as a tenant in common with the married entity.20 This
ancient absurdity seems still to be the law of North Carolina,27 and
decisions in other juridictions are in accord.28 It has similarly been
held that if land is conveyed to two married couples, each husband
and wife hold as tenants by the entirety as between themselves, but
as tenants in common with the other pair.20
A tenancy in common, and not a tenancy by the entirety, arises
where the husband and the wife have acquired their interests in the
land by a separate deed to each. For example, if two brothers own
land as tenants in common, and one conveys his half interest to the
wife of the other, the husband and the wife thereafter hold the land
at tenants in common and not as tenants by the entirety."0
A husband and a wife may acquire real property as tenants in
common, where there is no right of survivorship, if the conveyance
so indicates."' "However, in the absence of an expressed contrary
intention, a tenancy by the entirety arises whenever an estate is con-
veyed or devised to two persons, they being, when it is so conveyed
2626 Am. JuR., Husband and Wife § 70 (1940). "If, however, the estate
created by a conveyance or devise does not vest in husband and wife until
after they are married, it is immaterial that they were not married at the time
of the execution of the instrument under which they claim title." Id. at 698.4 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 622 (1954).
2Luther v. Luther, 157 N.C. 499,73 S.E. 102 (1911); Darden v. Tim-
berlake, 139 N.C. 181, 51 S.E. 895 (1905); Hampton v. Wheeler, 99 N.C.
222, 6 S.E. 236 (1888); see Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 205, 124 S.E. 566,
569 (1924); Moore v. Greenville Banking & Trust Co., 178 N.C. 118, 124,
100 S.E. 269, 272 (1919). See generally MORDECAI, LAw LECTuRES 608
(2d ed. 1916).
264 PowELL, REAL PROPERTY § 622 (1954).
29 Ibid.2°Isley v. Sellars, 153 N.C. 374, 69 S.E. 279 (1910) ; see Smith v. Smith,
249 N.C. 669, 678, 107 S.E.2d 530, 536 (1959). See generally 26 Am. JuR.,
Husband and Wife § 87 (1940).
"HIolloway v. Green, 167 N.C. 91, 83 S.E. 243 (1914) ; Eason v. Eason,
159 N.C. 539, 75 S.E. 797 (1912) ; see Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 207, 124
S.E. 566, 570 (1924); Moore v. Greenville Banking & Trust Co., 178 N.C.
118, 125-26, 100 S.E. 269, 273 (1919); Highsmith v. Page, 158 N.C. 226, 229,
73 S.E. 998, 999 (1912) ; Isley v. Sellars, 153 N.C. 374, 376-77, 69 S.E. 279,
280 (1910); Stalcup v. Stalcup, 137 N.C. 305, 306-07, 49 S.E. 210, 211
(1904). See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6(a) (1952);
MORDECAI, LAw LEcTuREs 609 (2d ed. 1916).
[Vol. 41
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or devised, husband and wife." 2 In determining whether the hus-
band and wife take as tenants in common or as tenants by the en-
tirety, the entire instrument passing the estate to them must be
examined. And if from the instrument it is determined that it was
intended that they should take as tenants in common, this intention
must prevail. The intention is to be arrived at from a perusal of the
entire instrument.83 In Eaon v. Eason84 it was held that a convey-
ance to a husband and wife "each one-half interest" created a tenancy
in common. It would also seem that a husband and a wife could
acquire land as tenants in common if land were conveyed to them
"as tenants in common and not at tenants by the entirety."
A tenancy by the entirety may exist in lands whether the estate
be in fee, for life, or for years, and whether the same be in possession,
reversion or remander."5 Equitable, as well as legal, estates may be
held as tenancies by the entirety. 6
Where a wife purchases land with her separate property or
money, and requests that the deed be made out to her husband and
herself, there is the presumption of a resulting trust in favor of the
wife and not an estate by the entirety.
It is one of the essentials of the peculiar estate by entireties
sometimes enjoyed by husband and wife that the spouses be
jointly entitled as well as jointly named in the deed. Hence,
if the wife alone be entitled to a conveyance, and it is made to
her and her husband jointly, the latter will not be allowed to
retain the whole by survivorship. And it matters not if the
conveyance is so made at her request, because being a married
" Davis v. Bass, supra note 31, at 207, 124 S.E. at 570 (1924).
:'Highsmith v. Page, 158 N.C. 226, 73 S.E. 998 (1912).
'159 N.C. 539, 75 S.E. 797 (1912).
" Sprinkle v. Spainhour, 149 N.C. 223, 62 S.E. 910 (1908) (life estate);
Stamper v. Stamper, 121 N.C. 251, 28 S.E. 20 (1897) (equitable: contract
to convey to husband and wife); Simonton v. Cornelius, 98 N.C. 433, 4 S.E.
38 (1887) (conveyance to husband and wife "during their natural lives");
see Lanier v. Dawes, 255 N.C. 458, 461, 121 S.E.2d 857 (1961); Davis v.
Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 209, 124 S.E. 566, 571 (1924). See generally 26 AM.
JUR., Husband and Wife §§ 66, 80 (1940); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 6.6 (1952); 41 C.J.S., Hisband and Wife § 34(b) (1944); MORDECAl, LAW
LEcTuEs 608 (2d ed. 1916).
" See note 35 supra.
" Deese v. Deese, 176 N.C. 527, 97 S.E. 475 (1918). See Ingram v.
Easley, 227 N.C. 442, 444, 42 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1947); Wilson v. Ervin
227 N.C. 396, 399, 42 S.E.2d 468, 470 (1947) ; Carter v. Oxendine, 193 N.C.
478, 481, 137 S.E. 424, 425 (1927).
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woman she is presumed to have acted under the coercion of
her husband.3 s
Under this view the wife is the sole and absolute owner, and upon
her death the husband acquires an interest in the same only by the
terms of her will 9 or the Intestate Succession Act. In 1959 the
court explained the expression "jointly entitled."4  It seems that
the court could have reached the same result through an application
of the ordinary dbctrine of a resulting trust. Under this doctrine,
when the purchase price of property is paid with the money of one
person, and the title is taken in the name of another, there arises the
presumption of a resulting trust in favor of the person furnishing the
money.4'
Where the husband furnishes the entire purchase price, and the
title to the land is placed in the name of himself and his wife, the law
presumes the creation of a tenancy by the entirety.4" There is a
presumption that the husband has made a gift to his wife of an
as Sprinkle v. Spainhour, 149 N.C. 223, 226, 62 S.E. 910, 911 (1908).
For this quotation or its restatement in other decisions, see Smith v. Smith,
249 N.C. 669, 677, 107 S.E.2d 530, 536 (1959) ; Davis v. Vaughn, 243 N.C.
486, 492, 91 S.E.2d 165, 169 (1956); Ingram v. Easley, 227 N.C. 442, 444,
42 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1947) ; Carter v. Oxendine, 193 N.C. 478, 481, 137 S.E.
424, 425 (1927); Deese v. Deese, 176 N.C. 527, 528, 97 S.E. 475 (1918);
Kilpatrick v. 'Kilpatrick, 176 N.C. 182, 185-86, 96 S.E. 988, 989 (1918);
Speas v. Woodhouse, 162 N.C. 66, 68-69, 77 S.E. 1000-001 (1913).
89 Or by dissent to the'will pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (Supp.
1961). Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 either spouse may in certain instances
dissent from the will of the other. But Dudley v. Staton, 257 N.C. 572, 126
S.E.2d 590 (1962) held that this statute violated Art. X, Sec. 6 of the North
Carolina Constitution insofar as it permits the surviving husband to dissent
from his deceased wife's will.
" "We should consider what is meant by the expression 'jointly entitled.'
It cannot be construed to mean that both the husband and wife had paid a
substantial or valuable consideration for the conveyance, nor that both of
them, jointly or individually, had some equity, right, title, interest, or estate
in the land before the conveyance was made." Smith v. Smith, 249 N.C. 669,
677-78, 107 S.E.2d 530, 536 (1959). If the law was otherwise a husband
owning land could not create an estate by the entirety by deeding the land
to himself and his wife.'E.g., Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v. Lester, 190 N.C. 411, 130 S.E. 45
(1925). See generally BOGERT, TRuSTS AND TRUSTEES §450 (1951); RE-
STATEMENT, TRUSTS §440 (1940); ScoTr, TRUSTS § 440 (2d ed. 1956).
Where the wife furnishes only a part of the purchase price, there arises a
resulting trust pro tanto in her favor. Cunningham v. Bell, 83 N.C. 328
(1880). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.3 (Supp. 1961), enacted in 1957, deals
with conveyances between husband and wife and would not seem applicable
to a conveyance from a third person to a husband and a wife.
' Bowling v. Bowling, 252 N.C.. 527, 114 S.E.2d 228 (1960) ; Morton v.
Blades Lumber Co., 154 N.C. 278, 70 S.E. 467 (1911); see Honeycutt v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank, 242 N.C. 734, 741, 89 S.E.2d 598, 604 (1955); cf. Akin
v. First Nat'l Bank, 227 N.C. 453, 42 S.E.2d 518 (1947).
[Vol. 41
TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY
interest in an estate by the entirety; and to rebut the presumption of
a gift and establish a resulting trust the evidence must be clear,
strong, and convincing. 43  It has been said that it is presumed the
husband knew the effect of his act."
Under the early common law a married person who owned real
property in fee simple could not create a tenancy by the entirety by
conveying the property directly to himself and the other spouse.
45
As a consequence, if a husband owned land and he wanted to convert
it into a tenancy by the entirety, he circumvented the rule by convey-
ing his land to a third person (a straw man) who in turn conveyed
the land to the husband and wife. The courts held that this transac-
tion created a valid tenancy by the entirety. "Indeed, this is the de-
vice customarily used in creating such an estate in land owned by one
spouse, when it is desired that it be held by the entireties."4 But
a statute enacted in 1957 has freed our law of this anachronism. The
statute provides for the creation and dissolution of a tenancy by the
entirety by direct conveyance between the spouses, as well as other
types of direct land conveyances between the spouses.'
"' See Bowling v. Bowling, 252 N.C. 527, 531, 114 S.E.2d 228, 231
(1960); Honeycutt v. Citizens Natl Bank, 242 N.C. 734, 741, 89 S.E.2d 598
(1955).
" Morton v. Blades Lumber Co., 154 N.C. 278, 70 S.E. 467 (1911). It
is generally held that a gift is presumed where a husband takes title to land
in the name of his wife. But a resulting trust and not a gift is presumed
where a wife purchases land in the name of her husband. E.g., Bullman v.
Edney, 232 N.C. 465, 61 S.E.2d 338 (1950); Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v.
Lester, 190 N.C. 411, 130 S.E. 45 (1925); See generally ScoTT, TRUSTS §442
(2d ed. 1956). The author doubts that the husband knows the'legal effect
of his act any more than does his wife. Furthermore, to him, it seems un-
sound to say that there is an inference that a husband intends to make a gift
to his wife, but not that a wife intends to make a gift to her husband. It
is not believed that husbands have a greater affection for their wives than
wives have for their husbands.
" Such an attempt failed because the required unities were not created
at the same time; one of the grantees had acquired his interest before the
other. 4 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 622 (1954).
"Smith v. Smith, 249 N.C. 669, 678, 107 S.E.2d 530, 536 (1959).
'7 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.3 (Supp. 1961) provides: "(a) A conveyance
from a husband or wife to the other spouse of real property or any interest
therein owned by the grantor alone vests such property or interest in the
grantee. (b) A conveyance of real property, or any interest therein, by a
husband or wife to such husband and wife vests the same in the husband and
wife as tenants by the entirety unless a contrary intention is expressed in the
conveyance. (c) A conveyance from a husband or a wife to the other spouse
of real property, or any interest therein, held by such husband and wife as
tenants by the entirety dissolves such tenancy in the property or interest
conveyed and vests such property or interest formerly held by the entirety
in the grantee. (d) .The joinder of the spouse of the grantor in any con-
veyance made by a husband or a wife pursuant to the foregoing provisions
of this section is not necessary. (e) Any conveyance by a wife authorized
19621
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A wife cannot convey her real property to her husband, either
directly or indirectly, without complying with the privy examination
requirements of G.S. § 52-12.18 A deed by a husband and wife con-
veying lands held by them as tenants by the entirety to a trustee for
the use and benefit of the husband is a conveyance of land by a wife
to her husband within the meaning of G.S. § 52-12 .4 A husband
however may convey to his wife any right, title or interest which he
owns in the real estate without complying with the requirements of
G.S. § 52-12.5o
In Hatcher v. Allen"1 a husband and a wife owned land as tenants
by the entirety. Subsequently they executed a deed of trust thereon
to secure money borrowed. Family discord developed, and the wife
left the husband. The wife contended that the husband continued in
possession of the property, collected the rents therefrom, and pur-
posely defaulted in the payments of the borrowed money so as to
bring about a foreclosure. She contended that the property was
purchased at foreclosure by a third person acting for the husband,
such third person reconveying to the husband. The court said that
if the wife could establish her allegations, the husband would hold
the title upon a constructive trust for both husband and wife. 2
No ENTIRETY IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
A tenancy by the entirety in personal property is not recognized
in North Carolina.53  In this state a tenancy by the entirety may
by this section is subject to the provisions of G. S. 52-12." The year pre-
ceding the enactment of this statute it was held that a husband owning land
could create a tenancy by the entirety by deeding the land to himself and
his wife. Woolard v. Smith, 244 N.C. 489, 94 S.E.2d 466 (1956); see Smith
v. Smith, 249 N.C. 669, 678, 107 S.E.2d 530, 536 (1959).
" Brinson v. Kirby, 251 N.C. 73, 110 S.E.2d 482 (1959) ; Davis v. Vaugh,
243 N.C. 486, 91 S.E.2d 165 (1956), noted in 34 N.C.L. Rnv. 571 (1956);
Honeycutt v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 242 N.C. 734, 89 S.E.2d 598 (1955);
McCullen v. Durham, 229 N.C. 418, 50 S.E.2d 511 (1948) ; Ingram v. Easley,
227 N.C. 442, 42 S.E.2d 624 (1924) (prior cases cited therein).
"Fisher v. Fisher, 218 N.C. 42, 9 S.E.2d 493 (1940).
'Hendley v. Perry, 229 N.C. 15, 47 S.E.2d 480 (1948) ; Walker v. Long,
109 N.C. 510, 14 S.E. 299 (1891).
220 N.C. 407, 17 S.E.2d 454 (1941).
'2 "Where the purchase by a third person was only nominal, he merely
acting as agent for one of the cotenants, a deed to him will be considered as
a matter of form merely and a conveyance from him to his principal will
come under the well settled rule that if one cotenant purchases an outstanding
title, and claims under it the common property as against the other, if they
contest it his claim will not be allowed, because it must be presumed that
each, as to the common interest, acts for all. That is to say, if one cotenant
purchases, either directly or indirectly, at a foreclosure sale he cannot, by
his own act, thus sever the cotenancy." Id. at 410, 17 S.E.2d at 456.
" Bowling v. Bowling, 243 N.C. 515, 91 S.E.2d 176 (1956); Wilson v.
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exist only in land and not in personalty of any kind. If a husband
and a wife are co-owners of personal property, nothing else appear-
ing, they hold as tenants in common.5'
Other states which permit tenancies by the entirety as to land
are divided as to whether this form of ownership can also be created
in personalty. 5 It has been said that the decided weight of authority
is that a tenancy by the entirety may exist in personal property as
well as in real property.50
In Turlington v. Lucas 7 a husband and wife were made payees
of a bond secured by a deed of trust on real property of the borrower.
The husband died. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that
the bond had been held by the spouses as tenants in common; and
that on the death of the husband his administrator took a half in-
terest in the bond and that the other half interest belonged to the
surviving wife. Similarly, in Winchester-Simmons Co. v. Cutler 8
a testator devised and bequeathed to "L. H. Cutler and wife, Laura
Ervin, 227 N.C. 396, 42 S.E.2d 468 (1947); Winchester-Simmons Co. v.
Cutler, 194 N.C. 698, 140 S.E. 622 (1927); Turlington v. Lucas, 186 N.C.
283, 119 S.E. 366 (1923); see Lanier v. Dawes, 255 N.C. 458, 462, 121
S.E.2d 857, 860 (1961) ; Bowling v. Bowling, 252 N.C. 527, 531, 114 S.E.2d
228, 231 (1960) ; Dozier v. Leary, 196 N.C. 12, 13, 144 S.E. 368, 369 (1928) ;
Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 209, 124 S.E. 566, 571 (1924) ; Gooch v. Wel-
don Bank & Trust Co., 176 N.C. 213, 216 (1918); Note, 6 N.C.L. Rnv. 342
(1928). The reason for not extending the estate by entirety to the personal
property in North Carolina, as has been done in a number of states, "is not
only that it is an anomaly in our judicial system, without any statute recog-
nizing it, and that it is contrary to our policy as to property rights of women,
as stated in the Constitution, but that it abstracts the property embraced in it
from liability to debt during the joint lives, and that all during this time the
husband enjoys the income from the wife's half of the property, as well as
from his own half." Turlington v. Lucas, 186 N.C. 283, 287, 119 S.E. 366,
368 (1923).
' As to the tenancy in common, see section 123 of the author's forth-
coming text on North Carolina Family Law. For discussion of joint bank
accounts, see section 126 of the same text.
" See 26 Am. JuR., Husband & Wife §§ 69, 76 (1940) ; 2 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY § 6.6(c) (1952); 41 C.J.S., Husband & Wife § 35 (1944);
MADDEN, PERSONS AND DoMESTIc RELATIONS § 45 (1931); 4 POWELL, REAL
PROPERTY §622 (1954); Annot., 8 A.L.R. 1017 (1920), supplemented by
Annot., 117 A.L.R. 915 (1938).
" 26 Am. JUR., Husband & Wife § 76 (1940); Annot., 8 A.L.R. 1017
(1920), supplemented by Annot., 117 A.L.R. 915 (1938).
186 N.C. 283, 119 S.E. 366 (1923).
58 194 N.C. 698, 140 S.E. 622 (1927), noted in 6 N.C. L. REv. 342 (1928).
This was a 3 to 2 decision. The dissenting opinion of Justice Conner. with
Chief Justice Stacy concurring in the dissent, expressed the idea that in the
light of the language used in the will a tenancy by the entirety was created:
"The estate or interest which Mr. and Mrs. Cutler take in the bonds is deter-
mined, not by the law, but by the language of the testator, which shows her
intention as to such estate or interest."
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D. Cutler, as husband and wife by entireties, all that certain house
and lot in the city of New Bern ... and ten thousand dollars of my
North Carolina four per cent bonds of par value, to have and to hold
the same real estate and bonds to them as husband and wife by
entireties and to the survivor of them in fee simple." The court held
that the bonds were held by the spouses as tenants in common, and
that the creditors of the husband could reach the husband's one-half
interest in the bonds but not the remaining half-belonging to the
wife. The devise of the real estate was not in controversy; pre-
sumably it was considered by all parties as constituting a valid
tenancy by the entirety.
When land held as a tenancy by the entirety is sold, the proceeds
derived from the sale are personalty and belong to the husband and
wife as tenants in common.59 The cash proceeds of the sale are not
held, as was the land itself, as tenants by the entirety with the right
of survivorship."° The spouses have, of course, the right to dispose
of the proceeds among themselves in any way they desire."'
Ordinarily, nothing else appearing, money in a bank deposited to
the credit of husband and wife belongs one-half to the husband and
one-half to the wife."2
Where land held as a tenancy by the entirety is sold and the pur-
chase price is made by checks payable to both husband and wife, and
the wife endorses the checks and turns them over to the husband who
endorses and cashes same and invests the proceeds in other property,
a trust arises by operation of law in favor of the wife in the absence
of eviderce that she intended to make a gift of her share of the pro-
ceeds to him, and she is entitled to an accounting of the proceeds."3
HUSBAND'S RIGHT TO CONTROL, POSSESSION AND INCOME
Although in a tenancy by the entirety neither spouse acting alone
can defeat 'the other spouse's right of survivorship in the whole
estate, the husband is entitled to the control and use of the land the
"' Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N.C. 396, 42 S.E.2d 468 (1947). See Bowling
v. Bowling, 252 N.C. 527, 531, 114 S.E.2d 228, 231 (1960); Bowling v.
Bowling, 243 N.C. 515, 519, 91 S.E.2d 176, 180 (1956); Honeycutt v. Citi-
zens Nat'l Bank, 242 N.C. 734, 743, 89 S.E.2d 598, 605 (1955).
60Ibid.81Ibid.
2 Bowling v. Bowling, 243 N.C. 515, 91 S.E.2d 176 (1956). See also
section 126 in the author's forthcoming text on North Carolina Family Law
dealing with joint bank accounts.
"' Bowling v. Bowling, 252 N.C. 527, 114 S.E.2d 228 (.1960).
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same as if it were his own."' The principles and incidents of a.ten-
ancy by the entirety have not been changed by article X, section- 6,
of the Constitution of North Carolina or by any of the statutes of
this state, 5 and they remain the same as at common law.66 During
the existence of the tenancy by the entirety, the husband has the
absolute and exclusive right to the control, use, possession, rents,
income, and profits of the land.6" The estate by the entirety is indeed
an anomaly. It seems strange in modern times that during marriage,
the wife's interest in the property held by the entirety should-be her
husband's and not hers.
The common-law rule giving to the husband the exclusive right
to the control, use, possession and income of an estate by the entirety
still exists in a small number of other states, but in the vast majority
the common-law rule has been modified by statute.6" It should be
changed by the statutes of North Carolina.
In West v. Aberdeen & R.R.R.6 9 the woods on an estate by the
entirety were damaged by a fire caused by the negligence of a xail-
"'Dorsey v. Kirkland, 177 N.C. 520, 522-23, 99 S.E. 407, 409 (1919);
Bank of Greenville v. Gornto, 161 N.C. 341, 342, 77 S.E. 222, 223 (1913).
"Moore v. Shore, 208 N.C..446, 447, 181 S.E. 275, 276 (1935); First
Nat'l Bank v. Hall, 201 N.C. 787, 789, 161 S.E. 484, 485 (1931); Johnson
v. Leavitt, 188 N.C. 682, 684, 125 S.E. 490, 491 (1924) ; Bank of Greenville
v. Gornto, supra. note 64, at 343, 77 S.E. at 223; West v. Aberdeen & R.R.R.,
140 N.C. 620, 621-22, 53 S.E. 477-78 (1906).
" Bynum v. Wicker, 141 N.C. 95, 53 S.E. 478 (1906) ; First Nat'l Bank
v. Hall, sipra note 65. See Johnson v. Leavitt, supra note 65.'7 Lewis v. Pate, 212 N.C. 253, 193 S.E. 20 (1937) ; Moore v. Shore, 208
N.C. 446, 181 S.E. 275 (1935) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Hall, 201 N.C. 787, 161
S.E. 484 (1931); Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 N.C. 682, 125 S.E. 490 (1924);
Dorsey v. Kirkland, 177 N.C. 520, 99 S.E. 407 (1919); Bank of Greenville
v. Gornto, 161 N.C. 341, 77 S.E. 222 (1913); Bynum v. Wicker, supra note
66; West v. Aberdeen & R.R.R., 140 N.C. 620, 53 S.E. 477 (1906); see In
re Perry's Estate, 256 N.C. 65, 70, 123 S.E.2d 99, 102 (1961); Smith v.
Smith, 255 N.C. 152, 156, 120 S.E.2d 575, 579-80 (1961); Porter v. Citizens
Bank, 251 N.C. 573, 577, 111 S.E.2d 904, 907-08 (1960) ; Nesbitt v. Fairview
Farms, Inc., 239 N.C. 481, 486, 80 S.E.2d 472, 476-77 (1954) ; Williams v.
Williams, 231 N.C. 33, 38, 56 S.E.2d 20, 24 (1949); Atkinson v. Atkinson,
225 N.C. 120, 129, 33 S.E.2d 666, 674 (1945) ; Wright v. Wright, 216 N.C.
693, 696, 6 S.E.2d 555, 557 (1940) ; Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 378, 137
S.E. 188, 191 (1927); Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 205-06, 124 S.E. 566,
569 (1924) ; Holton v. Holton, 186 N.C. 355, 361, 119 S.E. 751, 753 (1923) ;
Moore v. Greenville Banking & Trust .Co., .178 N.C. 118, 123-25, 100 S.E.
269, 272-73 (1919).
",See 26 Am. Jtm., Hitsband and Wife § 77 (1940) ; 2 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY § 6.6(b) (1952) ; 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife § 34(d) (1-) (a)
(1944); 4. PowELL, REAL PROPERTY § 623 (1954); Phipps, Tenancies. by
Entireties, 25 TEMPLE L.Q. 24 (1951) (contains table of the several states).
0' 140 N.C. 620, 53 S.E. 477 (1906).
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road. In holding that the wife was not a necessary party, the Su-
preme Court of North Carolina said:
But while at common law neither the husband nor the wife
can deal with the estate apart from the other, or has any in-
terest which can be subjected by creditors so as to affect the
right of the survivor, yet subject to this limitation the hus-
band has the rights in it which are incident to his own prop-
erty. He is entitled during the coverture to the full control
and the usufruct of the land to the exclusion of the wife ....
She is not entitled to sue for this damage nor to share in the
recovery.70
The husband may lease land held as a tenancy by the entirety
without the joinder or consent of the wife, and such lease will be
good against the wife during coverture and will fail only in the event
of her surviving him."1 This is because the husband is entitled to
the possession, use, income or usufruct of the property during their
joint lives. He is not required to account to his wife for any of the
rent received.
72
In Lewis v. Pate'3 it was held that crops raised on land held as
an estate by the entirety could be levied upon and sold under an
execution to satisfy a judgment against the husband to the exclusion
of any interest the wife may have."4
10 Id. at 621-22, 53 S.E. at 477. See also Carter v. Continental Ins. Co.,
242 N.C. 578, 89 S.E.2d 122 (1955); Bynum v. Wicker, 141 N.C. 95, 53
S.E. 478 (1906); cf. Jones v. W. A. Smith & Co., 149 N.C. 317, 62 S.E.
1092 (1908), where husband cut and delivered timber from an estate by the
entirety and the wife was not allowed to bring an action for a partition of
the proceeds of the sale in the hands of the purchaser.
"'Bank of Greenville v. Gornto, 161 N.C. 341, 77 S.E. 222 (1913) ; see
Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 N.C. 682, 683-84, 125 S.E. 490, 491 (1924); Davis
v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 205-07, 124 S.E. 566, 569-70 (1924); Moore v. Green-
ville Banking & Trust Co., 178 N.C. 118, 125, 100 S.E. 269, 273 (1919);
Dorsey v. Kirkland, 177 N.C. 520, 523, 99 S.E. 407, 409 (1919) ; Bynum v.
Wicker, supra note 70.
See cases cited note 67 supra.
"'212 N.C. 253, 193 S.E. 20 (1937).
"'A similar result was reached in Brinson v. Kirby, 251 N.C. 73, 110
S.E.2d 482 (1959). In Brinson the recorded deed to a farm was in the
names of a husband and wife as tenants by the entirety. A judgment was
obtained against the husband and an execution was issued to have sold, to
satisfy the judgment, a crop of tobacco produced on the farm. The wife
brought an independent action to prevent the sale of the tobacco. The court
held that the wife could do so by proving that the land was not after all held
as a tenancy by the entirety, but was really her own since her deed to a "straw
man" and the latter's deed to the husband and wife were void for failure to
comply with G.S. § 52-12.
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The husband may execute a mortgage on land held as an estate
by the entirety, without the joinder or consent of his wife, to the
extent of his common-law interest; but he has no right to encumber
the property so as to interfere with or defeat the interest of his sur-
viving wife."5 Upon his death the lien of the mortgage is ipso facto
cancelled and the entire estate is vested in the surviving wife."6 In
Bynum v. Wicker,77 where the husband mortgaged the estate by
entirety without the joinder of the wife, and upon a foreclosure of
the mortgage the purchaser went into possession of the premises,
the court said:
At common law 'the fruits accruing during their joint lives
would belong to the husband,' hence the husband could mort-
gage or convey it during their joint lives, that is, the right to
receive the rents and profits; but neither could encumber it or
convey it so as to destroy the right of the other, if survivor,
to receive the land itself unimpaired.7
As a result the wife in Bynum, during coverture, was allowed an
injunction restraining the purchaser from cutting the timber on the
land.
By virtue of the husband's common-law right to the possession
and control of the estate by the entirety, the husband alone may
grant to a third person a license, easement or right of way affecting
the property, which will be valid at least during their joint lives.
9
Whether it may continue beyond this time depends upon whether
the wife or the husband survives. Thus in Dorsey v. Kirkland,"'
where the husband granted a right of way by deed to a third person
without the joinder of the wife, the court said:
If as appears from these authorities, the husband has the con-
trol and use of the property during the life of his wife, and
may deal with it as his own, and if he may execute a valid
7 First Nat'l Bank v. Hall, 201 N.C. 787, 161 S.E. 484 (1931); Bynum
v. Wicker, 141 N.C. 95, 53 S.E. 478 (1906); see Willis v. Willis, 203 N.C.
517, 520, 166 S.E. 398, 399-400 (1932) ; Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 205, 124
S.E. 566, 569 (1924); Moore v. Greenville Banking & Trust Co., 178 N.C.
118, 125, 100 S.E. 269, 273 (1919); Dorsey v. Kirkland, 177 N.C. 520, 523,
99 S.E. 407, 409 (1919).
"' First Nat'l Bank v. Hall, supra note 75.
7 141 N.C. 95, 53 S.E. 478 (1906).
U8Id. at 96, 53 S.E. at 478.
"0 Dorsey v. Kirkland, 177 N.C. 520, 99 S.E. 407 (1919). See generally
41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife § 34(d) (1) (c) (1944).
177 N.C. 520, 99 S.E. 407 (1919).
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mortgage or a lease for ten years, we see no reason for refus-
ing to uphold his deed, subject to the limitation that all rights
will cease upon his dying before his wife."1
Although the husband may make contracts or conveyances af-
fecting his common-law right to the exclusive possession of the
estate by the entirety, it was held in Moore v. Shore"2 that the wife
is a necessary party to a contract or conveyance in reference to a
"negative easement,"8 3 because such involves more than mere pos-
session during the joint lives of the spouses. In Moore each deed
in a real estate subdivision provided that "the property herein de-
scribed shall be used for residential purposes only." One of the
owners of a lot in the real estate subdivision procured the written
permission to erect a filling station on his lot from the owners of all
the other lots affected by the restriction in their deeds, except in
reference to property owned by Mr. and Mrs. Moore as tenants by
the entirety. Mr. Moore gave his consent, but Mrs. Moore refused
to do so. In issuing a restraining order prohibiting the erection of
the filling station, the court said:
While it is settled law with us that the husband, during cover-
ture, may make valid conveyances and contracts affecting his
right of possession in land held by him and his wife as tenants
by the entireties, it is equally well settled as to tenants by the
entireties that 'neither can convey during their joint lives so
8 Id. at 523-24, 99 S.E. at 409. One wonders what will be the effect of
the husband's alone executing a mortgage, lease, or right of way when the
marriage is terminated not by death but by an absolute divorce, and the estate
by entirety is automatically converted into a tenancy in common. Absolute
divorces did not exist at common law.
82208 N.C. 446, 181 S.E. 275 (1935).
"A "negative easement" is a restriction which burdens the use of land
within a real estate subdivision. In discussing negative easements, the court
in Craven County v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 237 N.C. 502, 75
S.E.2d 620 (1953), said: "These servitudes, commonly referred to as nega-
tive easements, are usually imposed by restrictive covenants between the de-
veloper and the initial purchasers and become seated in the chain of title so
that subsequent purchasers are chargeable with notice thereof, thus fixing
it so each lot in a legal sense owes to all the rest of the lots in the subdivision
the burden of observing the covenant, and each of the rest of the lots is
invested with the benefits imposed by the burdens .... Therefore, where
land within a given area is developed in accordance with a general plan or
uniform scheme of restriction, ordinarily any one purchasing in reliance on
such restriction may sue and enforce the restriction against any other lot
owner taking with record notice, and this is so regardless of when each
pukchased; and similarly, a prior taker may sue a latter taker. The right of
action rests upon the principle that a negative easement of this sort is a
property right amounting to an interest in land." Id. at 512, 75 S.E.2d at 628.
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as to bind the other, or defeat the right of the survivor to the
whole estate,' and that 'neither could encumber it or convey
it so as to destroy the right of the other, if survivor, to receive
the land itself unimpaired. . . . We think the erection of such
service station would tend to defeat such rights of the wife,
since under the holdings of this Court the right to enforce a
restrictive building covenant will be lost where substantial
and radical changes take place in the affected area. [Cita-
tions omitted.] The change from residential use to use for a
filling station is both substantial and radical, and the loss of
the restriction would defeat the right of the survivor to re-
ceive the lots, now held by the entireties, with a residential
restriction extending to the other lots in said area.84
A husband may maintain an action for ejectment or damages
to land held as an estate by the entirety without a joinder of the
wife." He may also maintain an action for the establishment of the
true boundaries of the property without the joinder of the wife.8 6
While the husband is entitled to the possession of an estate by
the entirety, and to take the rents and profits during marriage, this
does not prevent such interest from being charged by a court order
for the support of the wife and minor children. 8 7 The court may
order the property to be rented out to produce an income to be
applied to the subsistence of the wife and children. 8 The court may
also issue a writ of possession, pursuant to G.S. § 50-17, giving the
wife possession of the estate by the entirety, in order that she may
apply the rents and profits as they shall accrue and become personalty
to the payment of alimony and counsel fees as fixed by the court.89
The court may even allow the wife exclusive possession of the home
owned by the spouses as tenants by the entirety in an action fixing
8, Moore v. Shore, 208 N.C. 446, 448, 181 S.E. 275, 276-77 (1935).
Nesbitt v. Fairview Farms, Inc., 239 N.C. 481, 80 S.E.2d 472 (1954);
West v. Aberdeen & R.R.R., 140 N.C. 620, 53 S.E. 477 (1906); Topping v.
Sadler, 50 N.C. 357 (1858)."6 Nesbitt v. Fairview Farms, Inc., supra note 85.
7 Sellars v. Sellars, 240 N.C. 475, 82 S.E.2d 330 (1954); Wright v.
Wright, 216 N.C. 693, 6 S.E.2d 555 (1940); Holton v. Holton, 186 N.C. 355,
119 S.E. 751 (1923) ; see In re Perry's Estate, 256 N.C. 65, 70, 123 S.E.2d
99, 102 (1961) ; Porter v. Citizens Bank, 251 N.C. 573, 577, 111 S.E.2d 904,
907-08 (1960)." Holton v. Holton, supra note 87, at 362, 119 S.E. at 754.
89 Porter v. Citizens Bank, 251 N.C. 573, 577, 111 S.E.2d 904, 907-08
(1960); Holton v. Holton, 186 N.C. 355,' 361, 119 S.E. 751, 753 (1923).
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alimony pendente lite and counsel fees under G.S. § 50-16. 0' The
court does not, however, have the power to order the sale of land
held as tenants by the entirety to procure funds to pay alimony to the
wife or to pay her counsel fees."'
RIGHTS OF CREDITORS
In North Carolina a tenancy by the entirety is not subject to levy
under execution on a judgment rendered against either the husband or
the wife alone.92 Neither the husband nor the wife has such an inter-
est in an estate by the entirety as can be sold under execution to satisfy
a judgment against him or her alone."8 The possibility that the
husband might survive the wife and thus become the sole owner
cannot be the subject of a sale under execution. 4 Such a possibility
does not constitute or create any present estate, legal or equitable,
any more than a contingent remainder or any other prospective
possibility. " Thus, in Bruce v. Nickolson,6 the court said:
The nature of this estate forbids and prevents the sale or dis-
posal of it, or any part of it, by the husband or wife without
the assent of both; the whole must remain to the survivor ....
As a consequence, neither the interest of the husband, nor
that of the wife, can be sold under execution so as to pass
title during their joint lives or as against the survivor after
the death of one of them .... Indeed it seems that the estate
9 Sellars v. Sellars, 240 N.C. 475, 82 S.E.2d 330 (1954); Wright v.
Wright, 216 N.C. 693, 6 S.E.2d 555 (1940).
"' See Porter v. Citizens Bank, 251 N.C. 573, 577, 111 S.E.2d 904, 907-08
(1960) ; Holton v. Holton, 186 N.C. 355, 362, 119 S.E. 751, 754 (1923).
" Edwards v. Arnold, 250 N.C. 500, 109 S.E.2d 205 (1959); Keel v.
Bailey, 214 N.C. 159, 198 S.E. 654 (1938); Winchester-Simmons Co. v.
Cutler, 199 N.C. 709, 155 S.E. 611 (1930); Southern Distrib. Co. v. Car-
raway, 189 N.C. 420, 127 S.E. 427 (1925); Johson v. Leavitt, 188 N.C.
682, 125 S.E. 490 (1924); Martin v. Lewis, 187 N.C. 473, 122 S.E. 180
(1924) ; Harris v. Carolina Distrib. Co., 172 N.C. 14, 89 S.E. 789 (1916) ;
Hood v. Mercer, 150 N.C. 699, 64 S.E. 879 (1909); Ray v. Long, 132 N.C.
891, 44 S.E. 652 (1903); Bruce v. Nickolson, 109 N.C. 202, 13 S.E. 790
(1891); see Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 205, 124 S.E. 566, 569 (1924);
Holton v. Holton, 186 N.C. 355, 361, 119 S.E. 751, 753 (1923); Bank of
Glade Spring v. McEwen, 160 N.C. 414, 418-19, 76 S.E. 222, 224 (1912);
cf. Lewis v. Pate, 212 N.C. 253, 193 S.E. 20 (1937).
93 Ibid.
" Edwards v. Arnold, 250 N.C. 500, 506, 109 S.E.2d 205, 209-10 (1959);
Bruce v. Nickolson, 109 N.C. 202, 206, 13 S.E. 790, 791 (1891).
95 Ibid.
"109 N.C. 202, 13 S.E. 790 (1891).
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is not that of the husband or the wife; it belongs to that third
person recognized by the law, the husband and wife."'
In states other than North Carolina there is a great deal of varia-
tion at the present time as to what, if anything, is available to the
separate creditors of either spouse during the existence of the tenancy
by the entirety." In a majority of the states, where the estate by the
entirety now exists, the interest of neither spouse may be sold to
satisfy a judgment obtained against only one of the spouses. 9 How-
ever, in a number of states, where the husband is allowed the ex-
clusive right to the control and use of the property during coverture,
it has been held that all of the property held by the entirety can be
reached by the husband's creditors, subject to the contingency that
the wife might survive him and become entitled to the whole estate.1"0
In these jurisdictions, as against the husband, the purchaser at the
execution sale acquires possession and title; as against the wife, if
the wife be living, the purchaser acquires title, but not the wife's
title. If the wife survives her husband she will have the absolute
title with the right of possession. If the husband survives the wife
the purchaser's title will be absolute.
Since in North Carolina the husband has the exclusive power
to the control, use, and income of an estate by the entirety,101 the
power to lease the property without the joinder of the wife,102 the
power to mortgage the property without the joinder of his wife,'0°
the power to grant by deed a right away without tle joinder of the
wife,' and the power to convey the property by warranty deed, by
way of estoppel, without the joinder of the wife,"0 5 qualified in all
these instances only by the possibility that the wife may become
entitled to the whole estate by surviving him-since the husband has
all these far-ranging powers-it would seem logical that the law
07 Id. at 204-05, 13 S.E. at 791. Also quoted in Ray v. Long, 132 N.C.
891, 895-96, 44 S.E. 652, 654 (1903).
" 26 Am!. JuR., Husband and Wife §§ 84, 85 (1940) ; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 6.6(b) (1952); 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife § 34(e) (1944);
MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIc RELATIONS § 45 (1931); 4 POWELL, REAL
PROPERTY § 623 (1954) ; Phipps, Tenancies by Entireties, 25 TEMPLE L.Q. 24
(1951); Annot., 166 A.L.R. 969 (1947).
" Phipps, supra note 98, at 39 and tables of states at 46-47 (1951); Annot.,
166 A.L.R. 969, at 983-93 (1947).
100 See note 98 supra.
101 See note 67 supra.
10. See note 71 supra.
102 See note 75 supra.
... See note 79 supra.
10' See notes 126 and 127 infra.
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should let the husband's creditors reach by execution his interest.
Generally speaking, that which a person may voluntarily transfer,
his creditors may reach. In fact, in Lewis v. Patel"0 the Supreme
Court of North Carolina held that crops raised on an estate by the
entirety could be levied upon and sold to satisfy a judgment against
the husband. This was not, however, a levy upon the husband's
interest in the estate by entirety, as such, but only upon the husband's
common-law right to the income, rents, and profits, accruing from
an estate by the entirety. Logical or not, North Carolina has con-
sistently held that land held as a tenancy by the entirety is not sub-
ject to levy under execution rendered against either the husband or
wife alone.'07 In touching upon this subject, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina in 1924 said "it should be remembered that law and
logic are not always the best of friends."'08
Where an attempt is made to sell under execution the interest of
only one of the spouses in land held as a tenancy by the entirety,
an action may be brought to restrain the sale because the deed of the
officer who sells will not pass title and will only throw a cloud upon
the title of the plaintiff.'0 9
A joint judgment against a husband and a wife may become a
lien upon land held by them as tenants by the entirety, and the land
may be sold under an execution to satisfy the judgment." 0 As a con-
sequence, when a husband or a wife owns no substantial property
other than that held by them as tenants by the entirety, and either
wishes to borrow money, it is customary for the lender to insist that
both sign the note as co-makers. A judgment obtained jointly against
a husband and a wife is a general lien on the interest of both in
property held by them as tenants by the entirety."'. Where such a
judgment is taken against both spouses and thereafter one dies, the
lien of the judgment continues on the land of the survivor."
2
In Southern Distrib. Co. v. Carraway" a consent judgment
106 212 N.C. 253, 19 S.E. 20 (1937).
107 See note 92 supra.
.. Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 N.C. 682, 685, 125 S.E. 490, 491 (1924).
...' Harris v. Carolina Distrib. Co., 172 N.C. 14, 89 S.E. 789 (1916).
110 Martin v. Lewis, 187 N.C. 473, 122 S.E. 180 (1924); see Edwards v.
Arnold, 250 N.C. 500, 506, 109 S.E.2d 205, 209-10 (1959); Winchester-
Simmons Co. v. Cutler, 199 N.C. 709, 712, 155 S.E. 611, 612-13 (1930);
Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 N.C. 682, 685, 125 S.E. 490, 492 (1924); Davis v.
Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 205, 124 S.E. 566, 569 (1924).
11126 Am. Jtm., Husband and Wife § 86 (1940); 41 C.J.S., Husband and
Wife § 34(e) at 475. See note 110 supra.11226 Am. JuR., op. cit. supra note 111.
1 189 N.C. 420, 127 S.E. 427 (1925).
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was entered against a husband and a wife "individually," and not
jointly, as upon -a joint obligation.- In holding that the estate by
entirety was not subject to be taken under an execution issued on
either judgment, the court-said:
It is specifically designated in the judgment that it is entered
against these defendants 'individually.' Their liability is not
joint and several .... The present judgment is against each
individually, or separately, and for purposes of lien and exe-
cution, it is tantamount to a personal and separate judgment
against each defendant .... 114
A husband and a wife holding as tenants by the entirety can
jointly convey the same free and clear of any judgment liens docketed
against either the husband or the wife." 5  Thus, if a judgment is
entered against a husband and duly docketed in a county in which
he and his wife own land as tenants by the entirety, the two spouses
may jointly thereafter convey to a third person a title that is not
subject to the judgment against the husband." 6
There is, however, in North Carolina frequently something to
be gained in obtaining and docketing a judgment against a husband
or a wife whose only property is held as a tenant by the entirety.
For example, if a judgment lien is obtained and docketed against a
husband, and later his wife dies, the judgment lien, if still active and
unsatisfied, will attach to the property instantly and at the very
moment when the title vests in the judgment debtor in his individual
right."" The acquisition by the judgment debtor of the title to such
property by right of survivorship places the property upon the same
footing in relation to the judgment as after-acquired property. The
lien attaches the instant there is a title capable of being encumbered.
If there have been several judgments obtained and docketed against
the husband during the marriage, the previously taken judgments
will all stand upon the same footing, and the proceeds of a sale there-
under will be distributed pro rata without reference to the priority
21, Id. at 421-22; 127 S.E. at 428.
... Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 -N.C. 682, 125 S.E. 490 (1924); Hood v.
Mercer, 150 N.C. 699, 64 S.E. 897 (1909) ; see Edwards v. Arnold, 250 N.C.
500, 506, 109 S.E.2d 205, 209-10 (1959); Keel v. Bailey, 214 N.C. 159, 165,
198 S.E. 654, 658 (1938).
216 Ibid. -
"' Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 WN.C. 682, 125 S.E. 490 .(1924). See generally
41 C.J.S., Hisband and Wife § 34(e) (1944).
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of such judgments or to the time of their docketing." 8 Thus in Keel
v. Bailey"9 a husband and a wife held real property as tenants by
the entirety. A valid judgment by confession was entered against
the husband in favor of his wife, and the same was duly docketed.
Thereafter the husband borrowed money and executed a deed of
trust on the land, without the joinder of his wife, to secure the in-
debtedness. Subsequently the wife died. It was held that on the
death of the wife, the estate by the entirety ceased and the title to
the property became vested in the husband; the lien of the wife's
judgment became immediately attached to the land and had prece-
dence over the attempted deed of trust subsequently made.
DEEDS AND MORTGAGES OF THE TENANCY BY ENTIRETY
The husband and the wife by their joint acts may convey by deed
their tenancy by the entirety to a third person.120  The tenancy by
the entirety which they owned is thereby destroyed or dissolved.'2 1
The grantee acquires the title to the land free and clear of any judg-
ment liens docketed against either the husband or the wife alone. 22
The proceeds derived from the sale are held by the husband and the
wife as tenants in common.123 Further, the tenancy by the entirety
may be conveyed by deed directly to either one of the two spouses. 24
Neither the husband nor the wife can convey any part of the
estate by the entirety, so as to defeat the right of the survivor in the
whole estate, without the written joinder of the other. 2 5 But in
Hood v. Mercer12 the court said: "It is true where the husband had
" Johnson v. Leavitt, supra note 117; Keel v. Bailey, 214 N.C. 159, 198
S.E. 654 (1938).
"" Ibid.
120 Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N.C. 396, 42 S.E.2d 468 (1947); see Moore v.
Greenville Banking.& Trust Co., 178 N.C. 118, 125, 100 S.E. 269, 273 (1919).
123 Ibid.
22 See note 115 supra.
' See note 59 supra.
12, See note 47 supra.
12. Bank of Greenville v. Gronto, 161 N.C. 341, 77 S.E. 222 (1913); Gray
v. Bailey, 117 N.C. 439, 23 S.E. 318 (1895) ; see Harrell v. Powell, 251 N.C.
636, 640, 112 S.E.2d 81, 84 (1960) ; General Air Conditioning Co. v. Douglas,
241 N.C. 170, 174, 84 S.E.2d 828, 832 (1954) ; Nesbitt v. Fairview Farms,
Inc., 239 N.C. 481, 486, 80 S.E.2d 472, 476-77 (1954); Moore v. Shore, 208
N.C. 446, 448, 181 S.E. 275, 276 (1935) ; Willis v. Willis, 203 N.C. 517, 519,
166 S.E. 398, 399 (1932); First Nat'l Bank v. Hall, 201 N.C. 787, 789, 161
S.E. 484, 485 (1931); Capps v. Massey, 199 N.C. 196, 197, 154 S.E. 52, 53
(1930); Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 378, 137 S.E. 188, 191 (1927);
Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 205, 124 S.E. 566, 569 (1924); Turlington v.
Lucas, 186 N.C. 283, 286, 119 S.E. 366, 368 (1923); Moore v. Greenville
Banking & Trust Co., 178 N.C. 118, 124, 100 S.E. 269, 273 (1919).
120 150 N.C. 699, 64 S.E. 897 (1909).
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conveyed land by deed with warranty without the joinder of the
wife, and survived her, his grantee acquired title, but this 'by way of
estoppel.1' 2 7 In Harrell v. Powell 28 the court affirmed the doctrine
of estoppel, and further held that the principles of estoppel should
apply to the wife in the same manner in which-they operate against
the husband. Thus where the wife conveys an estate by entirety .to
a third party during coverture, without joinder of her husband, and
the wife survives her husband, the third party acquires title by
estoppel.
129
North Carolina recognizes a broad concept of after-acquired
title by estoppel.130 Where the title to land is vested in husband and
wife as tenants by the entirety, and the husband conveys the land to
his wife, and then survives her, he and those claiming under him as
his heirs at law, as well as others standing in privity with him, are
estopped by his deed to claim the land.13' The same principle is
applicable where the marriage is terminated by divorce.'3 2 And,
indeed, it seems immaterial which of the spouses is conveying to the
other spouse sole ownership to the land.133
227Id. at 700, 64 S.E. at 898. This sentence has been quoted with approval
in the following cases: Harrell v. Powell, 251 N.C. 636, 640, 112 S.E.2d 81,
84 (1960); Capps v. Massey, 199 N.C. 196, 198, 154 S.E. 52, 53 (1930);
Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 206, 124 S.E. 566, 569 (1924); cf. Keel v.
Bailey, 224 N.C. 447, 31 S.E.2d 362 (1944).
251 N.C. 636, 641, 112 S.E.2d 81, 84 (1960); comments on this case
may be found in Seventh Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law 38
N.C.L. REv. 506, at 557, 588 (1960).
As to whether the same principle would apply to anything other than
a warranty deed, there is considerable doubt. In Harrell v. Powell, 251 N.C.
636, 641, 112 S.E.2d 81, 84 (1960), the court said: "Ordinarily the grantor
in a deed of bargain and sale is estopped thereby to assert after-acquired
title. But as a general rule the grantor in a quitclaim deed is not so estopped.
The provisions of a quitclaim deed may in some instances require a different
result, however. The deed and contract, in the case sub judice, are not before
us. Therefore the defense of estoppel must be affirmatively pleaded in the
answer if defendant relies thereon." But see Hallyburton v. Slagle, 132
N.C. 947, 952, 44 S.E. 655, 657 (1903), where the court in dictum stated:
"Indeed it has been said to have been fully established as a principle by the
best of authority, that the doctrine of estoppel applies to conveyances without
warranty when it appears, by the deed, that the parties intended to deal with
and convey a title in fee simple." This was quoted in Willis v. Willis, 203
N.C. 517, 521, 166 S.E. 398, 400 (1932).
180 See Seventh Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 38 N.C.L.
REv. 506, 589 (1960).
... Keel v. Bailey, 224 N.C. 447, 31 S.E.2d 362 (1944) ; Capps v. Massey,
199 N.C. 196, 154 S.E. 52 (1930) ; see Harrell v. Powell, 251 N.C. 636, 641,
112 S.E.2d 81, 84 (1960).
13 Willis v. Willis, 203 N.C. 517, 166 S.E. 398 (1932).
'8 "It is well settled in this State that a conveyance from one spouse to
the other of an interest in an estate held by the entireties is valid as an
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We have seen that the husband may execute a mortgage on land
held as an estate by the entirety, without the joinder or consent of
his wife, to the extent of his common-law interest; but he has no
right to encumber the property so as to interfere with or defeat the
interest of his surviving wife.134 Upon his death the lien of the mort-
gage is ipso facto cancelled, and the entire estate is vested in the
surviving wife.
135
The husband and the wife may jointly execute a mortgage or
deed of trust on land held by them as tenants by the entirety, and the
land may be sold under execution to satisfy the encumbrance. 13' The
encumbrance, executed by both spouses, continues as a lien on the
land of the survivor.1
3 7
The statutes of North Carolina, as well as those in a number
of other jurisdictions' provide a method of procedure to be followed
where it becomes necessary or desirable for an estate by the entirety
to be sold or mortgaged and the wife or the husband or both are
mentally incompetent to execute a conveyance of the estate so held."'
Another North Carolina statute defines the legal effect upon an
estate by the entirety when one of the tenants is presumed dead as
the result of being missing and unheard from for a period of seven
years. 4 o
estoppel when the requirements of the law are complied with in the execution
thereof." Jones v. Lewis, 243 N.C. 259, 262, 90 S.E.2d 547, 550 (1955).
Accord, Edwards v. Arnold, 250 N.C. 500, 506, 109 S.E.2d 205, 209-10
(1959). "The rule is different, however, when a wife conveys an estate by
the entirety to her husband Without complying with G.S. 52-12 (privy exami-
nation). Even though the husband dies she is not estopped to deny the
validity of the conveyance. Wallin v. Rice, 170 N.C. 417, 87 S.E. 239
(1915); Smith v. Ingram, 130 N.C. 100, 40 S.E. 984 (1902). This different
result is probably not due to the wife's being under a disability different in
kind from that imposed by Article X, section 6 of the North Carolina Con-
stitution, but rather because allowing an estoppel in this situation would
allow an obvious circumvention of G.S. 52-12." Seventh Annal Survey of
North Carolina Law, 38 N.C.L. Rnv. 506, 558 (1960).
""' See note 75 sapra. 13' See note 76 supra.
.. As to power of the husband and wife jointly to convey by deed their
tenancy by entirety, see note 120 supra. As to the liability for the estate by
the entirety for joint obligations of the husband and wife, see note 110 supra.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. §39-13.2 (Supp. 1961). G.S. §39-13.2 expressly
confers upon any married person under twenty-one years of age the power
to jointly execute with his or her spouse, if such spouse is twenty-one years
of age or older, certain transactions with respect to a tenancy by the entirety,
the same as if he or she were an adult.
1. 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife § 34(c) (1944).
.3 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-14 to -18 (1950). See Woolard v. Smith, 244
N.C. 489, 495, 94 S.E.2d 466, 470 (1956)." ,N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-197.1 (Supp. 1961).
[Vol. 41
TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY
An encumbrance or a lien cannot be placed on a tenancy by the
entirety without the consent of both husband and wife. In General
Air Conditioning Co. v. Douglass'4' a warm air-type-heating system
was installed in a home owned by a husband and wife as tenants by,
the entirety. The contract for the installation of the heating system
was made by the husband, and the company was unable to prove that
the husband was the agent of his wife. It was also unable to prove
agency by ratification or estoppel. As a consequence, the company
was not allowed to recover a judgment against the wife or to get a
mechanic's lien on the house. The court said: "A laborers' and
materialmen's lien arises out of the relationship of debtor and credi-
tor, and it is for the debt that the lien is created by statute. Without a
contract the lien does not exist."' 42 The heating company's remedy
was against the husband alone; and a judgment against the husband
alone could not be satisfied under an execution sale of the house.
EFFECT OF DEATH OF ONE SPOUSE
Upon the death of one of the spouses, the title to all land held as
tenancy by the entirety becomes automatically vested in the survivor
and the survivor becomes sole owner of the entire property 43 No
title or interest of any kind passes to the estate of the deceased and
it cannot be reached by the creditors or heirs of the deceased.'4 The
surviving spouse in a tenancy by the entirety acquires the whole of
the property by virtue of the original title and the doctrine of sur-
vivorship which is applicable to it. As a consequence, the property
so acquired is in addition to that which the survivor is entitled to
under the Intestate Succession Act or the provisions of the deceased
spouse's will.' "Death creates no new estate in the survivor. The
- 241 N.C. 170, 84 S.E.2d 828 (1954).
1,2 Id. at 174, 84 S.E.2d at 832.
..3 Underwood v. Ward, 239 N.C. 513, 80 S.E.2d 267 (1954); Murchison
v. Fogleman, 165 N.C. 397, 81 S.E. 627 (1914); see In re Perry's Estate,
256 N.C. 65, 67, 123 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1961); Honeycutt v. Citizens Nat'l
Bank, 242 N.C. 734, 743, 89 S.E.2d 598, 605 (1955) ; Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C.
200, 204-05, 124 S.E. 566, 569 (1924). See generally 26 Am. JUR., HIsband
and Wife § 82 (1940) ; 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife § 34(d) (2) (1940).
'" "Upon the death of one, either the husband or the wife, the whole
estate belongs to the other by right of purchase under the original grant or
devise and by virtue of survivorship---and not otherwise-because he or she
was seized of the whole from the beginning, and the one who died had no
estate which was descendible or devisable. It does not descend upon the
death of either, but the longest liver, being already seized of the whole, is
the owner of the entire estate." Davis v. Bass, supra note 143.
'. As to the right of the survivor to dissent from his or her deceased
spouse's will, and the effect of an estate by the entirety on such dissent, see
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (Supp. 1961).
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survivor takes by virtue of the original conveyance." 140
G.S. § 41-2, which abolished the right survivorship as an inci-
dent of a joint tenancy by operation of law, does not apply to ten-
ancies by the entirety.147 The doctrine of survivorship is still
applicable to tenancies by the entirety.
Existence of Mortgage
In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Black"'8 a husband pur-
chased land and had the title conveyed to his wife and to himself.
They executed a mortgage on the land to secure the balance of the
purchase price. The husband died. It was held that the surviving
wife became the sole owner of the property and could recover one-
half of the amount of the note secured by the mortgage from the
estate of her husband. This case was an adjudication of the liability
of the makers of the note as between themselves, and not an adjudi-
cation of their liability to the payee of the note. As makers of the
note they were jointly and severally liable, and payment of the whole
note by either entitled the other, or his representative, to contribu-
tion-an equitable doctrine which arises when one of several parties
liable on an obligation discharges the obligation for the benefit of
all. The results are that as between themselves each party is liable
for one-half the debt, although the title to the whole of the land is
vested in the survivor. In affirming the rule twenty-five years later,
the court said:
The fact that the plaintiff became the owner of the property
as the surviving tenant in an estate by the entirety, did not
thereby release the estate of her husband from liability for the
."Woolard v. Smith, 244 N.C. 489, 493, 94 S.E.2d 466, 469 (1956).
"1Bruce v. Nickolson, 109 N.C. 202, 13 S.E. 790 (1891); Motley v.
Whitemore, 19 N.C. 537 (1837) ; see Woolard v. Smith, 244 N.C. 489, 494,
94 S.E.2d 466, 469 (1956) ; Turlington v. Lucas, 186 N.C. 283, 285, 119 S.E.
366, 367 (1923); Moore v. Greenville Banking & Trust Co., 178 N.C. 118,
124, 100 S.E. 269, 273 (1919); West v. Aberdeen & R.R.R., 140 N.C. 620,
621, 53 S.E. 477 (1906).
1198 N.C. 219, 151 S.E. 269 (1930). See also Montsinger v. White,
240 N.C. 441, 443, 82 S.E.2d 362, 364 (1954) ; Underwood v. Ward, 239 N.C.
513, 515, 80 S.E.2d 267, 268 (1954). See generally 26 Am. JuR., Husband
and Wife § 79 (1940); Note, 37 N.C.L. RFv. 333 (1959).
The liability of the estate of the deceased husband to the widow for con-
tribution is not, however, such a claim as would qualify for a preference as
a secured claim under N.C. GEx. STAT. § 28-105 (1950). Since the land is
not an asset of the decedent's estate, the claim does not come within the first
class of priority listed in G.S. § 28-105. Where the decedent's estate is in-
solvent, the widow has to share pro-rata with the general creditors. Under-
wood v. Ward, supra; Note, 37 N.C.L. Rav. 333, at 335 (1959).
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debt. Moreover, the character of the estate held by the plain-
tiff and her husband prior to his death, had no significance
in respect to the liability of the parties on the note secured by
the deed of trust thereon. But in this jurisdiction when hus-
band and wife execute a note jointly and severally, promising
to pay for money loaned to them, or for the purchase of
property, and such indebtedness is secured by property held
by them as tenants by the entirety, each is primarily liable,
jointly and severally, and upon the death of either his or her
estate becomes liable for one-half of the unpaid balance of the
secured debt at the time of his or her death even though the
decedent's estate gets no part of the property pledged for
the debt.
149
In Montsinger v. White 50 a man, while single, purchased real
property and in part payment thereof executed a note secured by a
deed of trust. Subsequently he married and conveyed the property
to himself and his wife as tenants by the entirety. The wife neither
assumed nor agreed to pay the note secured by the deed of trust on
the property. Upon the husband's death, the widow paid the whole
of the balance due on the note, and filed a general claim for this
amount against the insolvent estate of her deceased husband. The
court held that by paying the note she became subrogated to the
rights of the mortgagee. One subrogated to a mortgage lien has
no right and no claim beyond those possessed by the creditor. As
a consequence, since the mortgagee could assert no claim against the
estate of the decedent until he had exhausted his security, tli widow,
as subrogee of the mortgagee, could assert no general claim against
the husband's estate for any amount in the absence of a contention
that the property was worth less than the amount she paid to dis-
charge the mortgage lien. The particular property was worth far
more than the balance due on the note. The note was not paid to
benefit the husband's estate, but to exonerate her own property from
the lien. The widow, accordingly, had no cause of action against
her husband's estate.
In Rudasill v. Cabaniss'5' a husband purchased land and re-
quested the seller to make the deed to himself and his wife as tenants
by the entirety. An unsecured note signed by the husband alone was
", Montsinger v. White, supra note 148.
180 240 N.C. 441, 82 S.E.2d 362 (1954).
15225 N.C. 87, 33 S.E.2d 475 (1945).
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given to. the seller for the entire purchase price. It was held that the
wife was not liable on the note, and, as a consequence, the property
was subject to no lien. There does not exist in North Carolina an
equitable lien for the purchase price of property. If a seller wants
to reserve a lien on the real property he sells, he must do so in writ-
ing-in the form of a mortgage or deed of trust.
Doctrine of Election
In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. B'urrus152 the testator devised
to his wife a life estate in land owned by them as tenants by the
entirety and devised the remainder after the life estate to another.
The testator also devised to his wife a life estate in other lands actu-
ally owned by him which had a value in excess of her rights had
she dissented from the will. The court held the widow was put to
an election, and her acceptance of the life estates with knowledge of
the nature of her title in the land theretofore held by the entirety
estops her heirs from claiming the remainder therein. With respect
to the doctrine of election, the court stated:
The doctrine of election is based upon the principle that a
devisee or donee cannot take benefits under a will and reject
its adverse provisions. The beneficiary under a will is not
required to elect unless two benefits are presented which are
inconsistent with each other. And when the beneficiary
chooses to accept one of them such choice is tantamount to a
rejection of the other. He will not be permitted to take under
the will and against it. And where the devisor purports to de-
vise property which belongs to the beneficiary, giving it to
another, and also devises property of his own to the bene-
ficiary, such beneficiary must make a choice between re-
taining his own property, which has been given to another,
or take the property which has been given to him under
the terms of the will. By electing to take the gift from
the devisor's estate, he is estopped from claiming his own
property.1
53
The intention of the testator to put the beneficiary to an election
must, however, appear clearly from the terms of the will.1 4 There-
-' "230 N.C. 592, 55 S.E.2d 183 (1949). See also Bolich, Election, Dis-
sent and Renunciation, 39 N.C.L. REv. 17, at 17-18 (1960); Annot., 60
A.L.R.2d 789 (1958).
I Id. at 593-94, 55 S.E.2d at 184.
""Taylor v. Taylor, 243 N.C. 726, 92 S.E.2d 136 (1956); Honeycutt v.
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fore, where it clearly appears from the will of the testator, who pre-
deceased his wife, that he attempted to devise land held by them as
tenants by the entirety under the mistaken belief that he owned the
land individually, the widow is not put to her election and may claim
sole ownership of the land held by the entirety, and at the same time
as legatee and devisee of the will.'5 5 Thus in Honeycutt v. Citizens
Nat'l Bank'56 the testator devised the tenancy by the entirety and other
property to his wife. He did not devise property he did not own to
a person other than the true owner. The widow's property was not
devised to another so as to compel her to decide whether she would
stand on her rights or abide by the terms of the will. The doctrine
of equitable election did not apply. In so holding the court stated:
"[I] f it appears that the testator erroneously considered the specific
property so devised to be his own, no election is required. An elec-
tion is required only when the will confronts a beneficiary with a
"choice between two benefits which are inconsistent with each
other.,157.
Simultaneous Death
The Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, enacted in North Carolina
in 1947 provides: "Where there is no sufficient evidence that two
joint tenants or tenants by the entirety have died otherwise than
simultaneously the property so held shall be distributed one-half as
if one had survived and one-half as if the other had survived."'
15
EFFECT OF MURDER OF ONE SPOUSE BY OTHER
In Bryant v. Bryant'59 a husband and wife owned property as
tenants by the entirety. The husband was convicted of his wife's
murder in the second degree and sentenced to the state prison. The
Citizens Nat'l Bank, 242 N.C. 734, 89 S.E.2d 598 (1955); Lamb v. Lamb,
226 N.C. 662, 40 S.E.2d 29 (1946); Benton v. Alexander, 224 N.C. 800, 32
S.E.2d 584 (1945).
' "The doctrine of election is not applicable to cases where the testator,
erroneously thinking certain property is his own, gives it to a donee to whom
in fact it belongs, and also gives him other property which is 'really the testa-
tor's own; for in such cases the testator intends that the devisee shall have
both, though he is mistaken as to his own title to one." Byrd v. Patterson,
229 N.C. 156, 159, 48 S.E.2d 45, 47-48 (1948).
- 242 N.C. 734, 89 S.E.2d 598 (1955). Also quoted in Taylor v. Taylor,
243 N.C. 726, 733, 92 S.E.2d 136, 141 (1956).
IrT Id. at 744, 89 S.E.2d at 606.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-161.3 (1950).
193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927), noted in 7 N.C.L. REv. 373 (1927)
and Annot., 51 A.L.R. 1100 (1927). Also quoted and commented upon in
I1; re Perry's Estate, 256 N.C. 65, 123 S.E.2d 99 (1961).
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court said that the property was to be held by the husband as a con-
structive trustee for the heirs of his wife, subject to a beneficial life
interest in the whole of the property for the murderer. The husband
was perpetually enjoined from conveying the property in fee. The
reason that the court permitted the murderer to have a beneficial in-
terest for life in the whole of the property is that under the law
governing a tenancy by the entirety in North Carolina, the husband
is entitled to the whole of the income and use during their joint
lives. In so holding the court stated:
It is therefore manifest that if the deceased wife were now
living the appellant (the husband) could not be deprived of his
interest in the estate by arbitrary judgment of the court.
None the less is he entitled to the enjoyment of such interest
after her death; but for the benefit of her heirs at law a court
of equity will interpose its protecting shield . . . . In the
application of this principle a court of equity will not deprive
the appellant of his interest in the estate, but the appellant by
his crime took away his wife's interest, and as to this he must
be held a constructive trustee for the benefit of her heirs, the
judge in effect having found as a fact that the deceased would
have survived him. Even in the absence of such finding,
equity would probably give the victim's representatives the
benefit of the doubt.160
The problem presented when one tenant by the entirety murders
the other has been solved in a variety of ways in other jurisdictions.Y1
The applicable North Carolina statute, G.S. § 31A-5, enacted in
1961, provides:
Where the slayer and decedent hold property as tenants by
the entirety: (1) If the wife is the slayer, one-half of the
property shall pass upon the death of the husband to his
estate, and the other one-half shall be held by the wife during
her life, subject to pass upon her death to the estate of the
husband; and (2) If the husband is the slayer, he shall hold
-I" Id. at 378-79, 137 S.E. at 191.
... 26 Am. JuR., Hu.band and Wife § 82 (1940); 41 C.J.S., Husband and
Wife § 34(d) (2) (1944) ; MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 45
(1931); Note, 7 N.C.L. Rav. 373 (1927); 4 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 623
(1954); RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 188 (1937); Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d
1099 (1953).
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all of the property during his life subject to pass upon his death
to the estate of the wife.
Subsection (2) is in substance the doctrine announced in Bryant v.
Bryant'0 2 while subsection (1) is new law.
It re Perry's Etatate 63 was a case where the wife in 1956 pleaded
guilty to her husband's murder in the second degree. The husband
died intestate, survived by his wife and a daughter. The adminis-
trator's final account, filed in 1960, showed a balance of $1,091.53,
derived wholly, prior to the husband's death, from rents accruing
from a tenancy by the entirety. The sole issue in the case on appeal
to the supreme court in 1961 was: Who is entitled to the rents from
the real property? The supreme court, affirming the trial court,
held that the surviving wife was a constructive trustee, for the
daughter, of the rents and profits of the tenancy by the entirety, at
least during the full term of the husband's life expectancy, in accord-
ance with the equitable principle that a person will not be permitted
to benefit from his own wrong. In referring to G.S. § 31A-5, which
was enacted only a few months prior to the filing of the opinion, the
court said: "Suffice to say, this 1961 Act has no bearing on the
present case. Decision here is based on the North Carolina law with
reference to an estate by the entirety and upon the equitable prin-
ciples declared and underlying the decision in Bryant."' 4  G.S.
§ 31A-5 probably had no bearing because it was enacted subsequent
to the death of the husband. If a wife murders her husband today,
it would seem that the provisions of G.S. § 31A-5 should control,
such provisions seeming to give to her one-half of the income from
the tenancy by the entirety for the period of her life.
EFFECT OF DIVORCE
In North Carolina an absolute divorce automatically converts a
tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy in common." 5 The marital
.02 See note 159 supra.
256 N.C. 65, 123 S.E.2d 99 (1961).
261 Id. at 71, 123 S.E.2d at 103.
.. Potts v. Payne, 200 N.C. 246, 156 S.E. 499 (1931); McKinnon v.
Caulk, 167 N.C. 411, 83 S.E. 559 (1914); see Lanier v. Dawes, 255 N.C.
458, 462, 121 S.E.2d 857, 860 (1961); Smith v. Smith, 249 N.C. 669, 674-
675, 107 S.E.2d 530, 535 (1959); Carter v. Continental Ins. Co., 242 N.C.
578, 580, 89 S.E.2d 122, 123 (1955); Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N.C. 396, 399,
42 S.E.2d 468, 469 (1947); Hatcher v. Allen, 220 N.C. 407, 409, 17 S.E.2d
454, 455 (1941); Fisher v. Fisher, 217 N.C. 70, 76, 6 S.E.2d 812, 816-17
(1940) ; Willis v. Willis, 203 N.C. 517, 520, 166 S.E. 398, 399-400 (1932) ;
Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 207, 124 S.E. 566, 570 (1924); Holton v.
1962]
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unity, an absolute necessity for the formation and the continuance
of an estate by the entirety, is destroyed by an absolute divorce. The
estate by entirety is founded upon the marital status and the com-
mon law fiction of the unity of the husband and wife, and when that
"unity of the person" is severed by a decree of absolute divorce, the
only logical conclusion is that the former spouses thereafter become
two persons and the title to the property is vested in them as tenants
in common. As tenants in common, each owns an undivided one-
half interest in the whole. Either may maintain a proceeding for
partition. At the present time this is also the prevailing view in the
vast majority of other states which recognize the tenancy by en-
tirety.' 6
The two former spouses become equal cotenants, without inquiry
as to who paid the original purchase price of the property.1 7 Even
though one of the former spouses paid the entire purchase price, each
becomes entitled to an undivided one-half of the whole or to parti-
tion.'" Expenditures for the property are treated as they normally
would be in a tenancy in common from the date of the final decree
of divorce.1 9
An absolute divorce converts a tenancy by the entirety into a
tenancy in common even though the divorce was granted in one
jurisdiction and the property is situated in another.11 0
A house or other building owned as an estate by the entirety may
be insured in the name of either spouse or in the name of both. 71
Holton, 186 N.C. 355, 362, 19 S.E. 751, 754 (1923); Turlington v. Lucas,
186 N.C. 283, 286, 119 S.E. 366, 367-68 (1923) ; Moore v. Greenville Banking
& Trust Co., 178 N.C. 118, 126, 100 S.E. 269, 274 (1919); Finch v. Cecil,
170 N.C. 72, 75, 86 S.E. 992, 993-94 (1915). Where a husband and a wife
own an estate for life by the entirety and are divorced, their estate is converted
into a tenancy in common for life, and the survivor acquires only a life estate
in an undivided one-half interest in the real property. Lanier v. Dawes,
supra
26 Am. JUR., Husband and Wife § 117 (1940); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 6.6a (1952); 27A C.J.S., Divorce § 180(b) (2) (1959); MADDEN,
PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 45 (1931); 4 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
§ 624 (1954); SCHOULER, DIVORCE. MANUAL § 194 (Warren ed. 1944); 4
THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 1792 (repl. 1961); Note, 36 VA. L. REV. 557
(1950) ; Annot., 52 A.L.R. 890 (1928).
... 4 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 624 (1954).. 10 27A C.J.S., Divorce § 180(b) (2) (1959).
:L9 Ibid.
7026 Al!. JuR., Husband and Wife § 117 (1940); 4 POWELL, RE AL
PROPERTY § 624 (1954).
. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-180.1 (1960) provides: "A policy of fire insur-
ance issued to husband and wife, on buildings and household furniture owned
by husband and wife, either by entirety, in common, or jointly, either name
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If the husband alone has been named as the insured ,or as the bene-
ficiary of the policy, his insurable interest runs to the whole of the
property and covers the entire estate.1 2 If the btiilding is destroyed
by fire, the proceeds inure to the benefit of the entire estate .as owned
by both husband and' wife., in a case where the marriage was
severed by divorce after the firebut before payment of the.proceeds
of the policy by the insurance company,. the North Carolina Supreme
Court held -that each of the, former spouses. -was- entitledto one-half
of the proceeds."' -
A divorce' from bed- andl board, as"distinguished from an abso-
lute divorce, has no legal effect upon an estafe-'by the, entirety. 74
This is because a divorce from bed and board does not dissolve the
bond of matrimony; it is in legal effect nothing more than a decree
of separation. The parties still remain husband and wife in -the eyes
of the law. The estate by the entirety rests upon the unity of the
husband and wife, and a divorce from bed and board does not sever
this "unity of the persons."
An estate by the entirety is not terminated by acts of the parties
constituting grounds for absolute divorce. Nothing short of a final
decree of absolute divorce will convert a tenancy by the entirety into
a tenancy in common. "The existence of an estate by entirety is not
of one of the parties in interest named as the insured or beneficiary therein,
shall be sufficient and the policy shall not be void for failure to disclose the
interest of the other, unless it appears that in the procuring of the issuance
of such policy, fraudulent means or methods were used by the insured or
owner thereof." See also Carter v. Continental Ins. Co., 242 N.C. 578, 89
S.E.2d 122 (1955), noted in 35 N.C.L. Ruv. 134 (1956).
112 Carter v. Continental Ins. Co., supra note 171.
.. Ibid. The theory, or lack of stated theory, on which this case was
decided was criticized in a note in 35 N.C.L. REv. 134 (1956).
"" Freeman v. Belfer, 173 N.C. 581, 92 S.E. 486 (1917); see Potts v.
Payne, 200 N.C. 246, 249, 156 S.E. 499, 500-01 (1931); Davis v. Bass, 188
N.C. 200, 208, 124 S.E. 566, 570 (1924); Turlington v. Lucas, 186 N.C. 283,
286, 119 S.E. 366, 367-68 (1923). See generally, 26 Am. JUR., Husband and
Wife § 117 (1940) ; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6a (1952) ; 4 POWELL,
REAL PROPERTY § 624 (1954); 4 TnOMPsON, REAL PROPERTY § 1792 (repl.
1961); Annot., 168 A.L.R. 260 (1947). N.C. GEN. STAT. §31A-1 (1961)
would not seem to affect survivorship rights in an estate by the entirety.
The doing of certain acts, set forth in'subsection (a), will bar the rights of
the spouse in respect to certain rights set forth in subsection (b). But
nothing contained in subsection (b) deals with the survivorship rights of an
estate by the entirety. Statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly
construed. Among the rights lost in subsection (b) (1) are "all rights of
intestate succession in the estate of the other spouse"; but as we observed
in this article at note 143 supra, the surviving spouse in an estate by the
entirety acquires the whole of the property by virtue of the original title and
the doctrine of survivorship applicable to it, and not as the result of the
Intestate Succession Act.
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dependent upon the good conduct of the respective tenants and it is
not destroyed by the bad conduct of either."' 7 5
It has been held that an action by a husband and wife, involving
title or possession to property held by them as tenants by the en-
tirety, will not be barred by the statute of limitations or laches as
to one unless it bars bothM The nature of the estate and the interest
of the husband and the wife are so thoroughly identified that the right
of the one cannot be barred without the like bar of the other's right.
'7 Hatcher v. Allen, 220 N.C. 407, 411, 17 S.E.2d 454, 456 (1941).178Johnson v. Edwards, 109 N.C. 466, 14 S.E. 91 (1891) ; see Davis v.
Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 208, 124 S.E. 566, 570 (1924).
